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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Circle Airfreight, Respondent 
herein, against Appellant, Boyce Equipment, to collect freight 
charges from Appellant for shipping services performed on 
Appellant's behalf on or about August 9, 1982 and August 26, 
1982. 
The Course of the Proceedings 
The matter was tried before The Honorable Phillip R. Fishier 
on May 10, 1985 sitting without a jury. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The trial court granted judgment in favor of Respondent and 
against Appellant for the freight charges for the August 9, 1982 
shipment, but denied recovery of the freight charges for the 
Respondent on the second shipment. Appellant, Boyce Equipment, 
brought this appeal from the judgment for freight charges on the 
August 9, 1982 shipment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about August 9, 1982 and August 26, 1982, Respondent, 
Circle Airfreight, at the request of and/or for the benefit of 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, undertook to deliver certain truck 
parts on a "collect" or "freight collect" basis, to A.H.W. 
Corporation and/or C.M.C. Corporation in Conakry, Africa. (TR. 
86, 93, Addendum A-l and A-2.) Respondent thereupon delivered 
both shipments to A.H.W. and/or C.M.C. without collecting the 
freight charges. 
Thereafter, Respondent made demand upon Appellant, Boyce 
Equipment, for the outstanding freight charges for both 
shipments. Appellant refused to pay the same, asserting that 
liability for the freight laid with A.H.W. and/or C.M.C. and not 
wi th Appellant. 
Appellant signed the Shipper's Letter of Instruction for 
both Shipments, Exhibit 7-D and 10-P (Addendum A-10 and A-ll) as 
shipper, and claims that it marked both documents "collect" 
and/or directed both shipments to be made on a "freight collect" 
basis (TR. 86, 93, Addendum A-l and A-2) and that it was shown 
and/or received copies of both documents (Appellant's Brief p. 
13). However, the Shipper's Letter of Instructions for the 
August 9, 1982 shipment, Exhibit 10-P (Addendum A-ll) is marked 
"prepaid". Appellant, Boyce Equipment, was additionally 
designated as the "shipper" or consignor on Respondent's Uniform 
Air Waybills, for both shipments. Exhibits 11-P and 16-P 
(Addendum A-12 and A-13) though these were not signed by 
Appe 1 lant. 
Based upon these facts, Respondent brought action against 
Boyce Equipment to collect the outstanding charges for both 
shipments in the District Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent, Circle Airfreight, contends the judgment entered 
by the trial court with respect to the August 9, 1982 shipment 
was appropriate and should be affirmed. 
1. Appellant, Boyce Equipment, was, in poi nt of fact, the 
seller, shipper and consignor of both the August 9, 1982 and the 
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August 26, 1982 shipments and signed the Shipper's Letter of 
Instructions for both shipments as such. Under these 
circumstances, the authorities cited herein, infra, clearly 
establish that Appellant's disclosed agency argument is clearly 
inappropriate. Furthermore, the testimony offered by Appellant's 
representative, Mark Boyce, in the District Court proceeding, 
together with the Shipper's Letter of Instructions for both 
shipments, show that the shipments were not shipped C.O.D. (TB. 
86, 93, 160, Addendum A - l , A-2 and A - 3 ) . 
2. It is well settled that a consignor who tenders freight 
to a carrier for transportation is the party primarily liable for 
freight charges, notwithstanding a direction that the shipment be 
delivered "collect" or on a "freight collect" basis, unless the 
consignor and the carrier contractually agree that the carrier 
will look to another party only for payment. It is held without 
exception that the direction that a shipment be delivered 
"collect" or "freight collect" is not contractual, its effect 
being merely to give the carrier an option to demand payment from 
the consignee, and that such a direction is therefore, 
insufficient to relieve the consignor of liability for the 
freight charges. 
Moreover, the Conditions of Contract set forth on the 
reverse side of Respondent's Uniform Air Waybill, contains 
explicit wording whereby "the shipper agrees to guarantee all 
charges and advances" and thus assume the primary obligation for 
the payment of the freight. The Conditions of Contract also 
prohibits any alteration or modification of any provision 
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contained therein. These provisions clearly preclude any 
contractual agreement between Appellant and Respondent whereby 
Respondent agreed to look to another party only for payment of 
the freight charges. 
3. Finally, Respondent herein, infra, contends that 
Appellant, in arguing that Respondent "is equitably estopped from 
claiming [Appellant] is liable to pay the freight charges" by its 
conduct in delivering the shipments without collecting the 
freight charges, overlooks the well established legal principle 
that a direction by the shipper that a shipment be carried 
"freight collect" is insufficient to relieve the shipper of its 
liability for freight charges. Indeed such a direction imposes 
no obligation on the carrier to insist upon payment of the 
freight before delivery. If the carrier sees fit to waive his 
right of lien and deliver the goods without payment of the 
freight, the carrierTs right to resort to the shipper for 
compensation still remains. Moreover, the authorities are in 
agreement that, except for the running of the Statute of 
Limitations, no act or omission of the carrier can estop or 
preclude it from enforcing payment of the freight by a person 
1 iable therefor. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
APPELLANT, BOYCE EQUIPMENT, WAS THE SELLER AND CONSIGNOR OF THE 
FREIGHT SERVICES WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT PROCEEDING, 
AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR A DISCLOSED 
PRINCIPAL IN REQUESTING SAID SERVICES. 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, in Point I of its Brief of 
Appellant on file in the instant proceeding (hereafter referred 
4 
to as "Appellant Ts Brief"), argues that it was "an agent acting 
on behalf of a disclosed principal, C.M.C. Corp., and [therefore] 
has no liability for carrier Ts freight charges." See A p p e l l a n t s 
Brief at p. 18. In support of this argument Appellant asserts 
the following: 
CMC Corp., the concern on behalf of which 
Boyce requested the transportation, was not 
only fully disclosed to Carrier by Boyce, (Ex. 
14-P), Carrier inserted the principal's name 
and addresses on the commercial invoice 
prepared by Carrier, (Ex. 23 - P ) . By preparing 
that invoice, Carrier acknowledged that CMC 
Corp., Boyce Ts principal, was responsible for 
the freight and the cost of the parts. 
(Emphas i s added.) 
Appellant's Brief at p. 18. 
Contrary to this assertion by Appellant, nothing in 
Appellant's parts invoice, Exhibit 14-P (Addendum A - 1 4 ) , or the 
commercial invoice prepared by Respondent, Exhibit 23-P (Addendum 
A - 1 5 ) , suggests or "discloses" that Appellant, Boyce, was an 
agent acting on behalf of a fully disclosed principal, C.M.C. 
Corp., or that Respondent acknowledged the same. Appellant, 
however, apparently contends that, because both documents bill 
C.M.C. for "costs and freight," that is, for the cost of the 
parts invoice as well as the freight charges, this indicates that 
Appellant was acting as an agent for C.M.C. Corp., a fully 
disclosed principal. Appellant then cites two cases, Lou i sv i1le 
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 
68 L.Ed. 900 (1923), and Transport Clearings of Los Angeles v. 
F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals, 289 P.2d 173 (Nev. 1955) for their 
holding that, where the goods being shipped are not owned by the 
consignor and were not shipped on his account or for his benefit, 
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the carrier is not entitled to call upon the consignor for the 
freight charges, notwithstanding the fact that the consignor 
signed the shipping order as shipper. Appellant further asserts 
that Tt[t]he material facts in the instant case are essentially 
the same as those in the Loui svi1le case." Appellant Ts Brief p. 
20. 
Contrary to Appellant Ts assertion, the factual circumstances 
found in the instant case are remarkably distinguishable from 
those found in Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & C. 
Co., 265 U.S. 59, 68 L.Ed. 900, supra. In Louisvi1le, supra, the 
consignor shipper, Central Iron & Coal Co. (Central Company) sold 
ten carloads of coal to Tutwiler & Brooks to be delivered f.o.b. 
at the seller Ts plant in Holt, Alabama. Before delivery by the 
seller, the purchasers, Tutwiler and Brooks, sold the coal to 
Great Western Smelters Corporation of Mayer, Arizona (Smelters 
Corporation). Thereafter "under instruction from Tutwiler and 
Brooks and upon their agreement to pay the freight, the Central 
Company delivered, at its plant, the cars of coal to the 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad; directed shipment thereof to 
Mayer over that railroad and connecting lines; and took the bills 
of lading, which it delivered immediately to Tutwiler & 
Brooks." Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Central Iron & C. Co., 265 
U.S. 59, 68 L.Ed. 900, 901 (1924), supra. "That firm (Tutwiler & 
Brooks) made a draft for the purchase price on the Smelters 
Corporation with bills of lading attached. The corporation paid 
the draft; received the bills of lading; and, upon surrendering 
them to the delivering carrier and payment to it of the freight 
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demanded, obtained possession of the coal. The amount of the 
freight then demanded and paid was $5,082.15- The freight 
legally payable, according to the tariff, was $8,545.61." 
Louisvi H e , 265 U.S. 59, 64, 68 L.Ed. 900, 901-902, supra. 
Although the shipment was made in January, 1917, the undercharge 
was not discovered until January, 1920, at which time Louisville 
& Nashville made demand upon Central Company for the full amount 
of the undercharge, or $3,463.46. Louisvi1le, 265 U.S. 59, 64, 
68 L.Ed. 900, 901-902, supra. After further ascertaining that 
"[t]he bills of lading acknowledged receipt of the coal from the 
Central Company," stated that the coal was "consigned to ORDER OF 
Tutwiler & Brooks, Destination Mayer, Arizona," and provided that 
"the owner or consignee shall pay the freight and average, if any 
. and, if required, shall pay the same before delivery," 
Loui svi 1 le, 265 U.S. 59, 64, 68 L.Ed. 900, 902, supra., the 
United States Supreme Court determined the following: 
In this case, the bills of lading 
acknowledge -receipt of the coal from the 
Central Company. But it did not sign them. 
Nor was it described therein as the 
consignor. There was no clause by which the 
shipper agrees expressly either to pay the 
freight charges or to guarantee their 
payment. The goods were not declared to be 
deliverable to the Central Company Ts order. 
On the contrary, the form of the bill of 
lading indicated that it was neither the owner 
nor the person on whose behalf the shipment 
was being made; and that Tutwiler & Brooks 
were either the owners or the person in whose 
behalf the shipment was being made. On these 
facts the trial court was justified in finding 
that the Central Company did not assume the 
primary obligation to pay the freight 
chargesT (Emphas i s added.) 
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Louisville & N. R. Co, v, Central Iron & C. Co,, 265 U.S. 
59, 68 L.Ed. 900, 904 (1924), supra. 
In sharp contrast to the factual circumstances in 
Loui svi1le, supra., Appellant in the instant proceeding, is named 
as the "shipper" or consignor on both the Air Waybill for the 
first shipment, dated August 9, 1982, Exhibit 11-P, and the Air 
Waybill for the second shipment, dated August 26, 1982, Exhibit 
16-P. Furthermore, both the Shipper fs Letter of Instructions for 
the first shipment, Exhibit 10-P, and the second shipment, 
Exhibits 7-D and 15-P (Addendum A-11, A-10 and A-16) were signed 
by the Appellant through its representative, Mark Boyce, as 
shipper and both documents reflect that Appellant, Boyce, 
consigned both shipments to a destination in Conakry, Guinea, 
Africa. It is also important to note that in Loui svi1le, supra, 
Central Company, the original seller of the freight, was, in 
fact, acting as an agent for Tutwiler & Brooks, the original 
purchaser of the freight, after Tutwiler & Brooks resold and 
consigned the freight to Smelters Corporation, and was not in 
fact, the seller or consignor, whereas in the instant case, 
Appellant was in fact the seller or consignor of the goods 
shipped to C.M.C. and/or A.H.W. on August 9, 1982 and August 26, 
1982 and consigned both shipments to A.H.W. and/or C.M.C. in 
Conakry, Africa. 
The testimony offered by Appellant Ts representative, Mark 
Boyce, in the District Court proceeding, as well as the shipping 
documents discussed above, clearly establish that Appellant both 
sold and consigned the two freight shipments to C.M.C. and/or 
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A.H.W. in Conakry, Africa. Mark Boyce, on direct examination by 
A p p e l l a n t s counsel with respect to the relationship between 
C.M.C. and A.H.W. testified that they were the "same parent 
company" and further commented with respect to C.M.C. and A.H.W., 
"I thought it was a name change is all." (TR. 78, Addendum A-
4.) Mark Boyce also admitted on direct examination from 
Appellant Ts counsel that he initially requested that Respondent 
deliver the two shipments to Conakry, Africa. fTR. 78, 92, 
Addendum A-5 and A-6.) These admissions by Mark Boyce together 
with the Air Waybills for both shipments, Exhibits 11-P and 16-P, 
which name Appellant as "shipper" or consignor, and the Shipper Ts 
Letter of Instructions for both shipments, Exhibits 7-D and 10-P, 
which Appellant signed as "shipper" or consignor, establish that 
Appellant was the consignor and seller of the freight shipped to 
Conakry, Africa, and distinguish the instant proceeding from the 
Loui svi1le case relied upon by Appellant. 
Likewise the second case relied upon by Appellant, Transport 
Clearings of Los Angeles v. F.J. Purdy Iron ic Metal, 289 P.2d 173 
(Nev. 1955), supra, is distinguishable on the facts and does not 
support Appellant Ts argument that it was acting as an agent for a 
disclosed principal. As with the Loui svi1le case, supra, 
Appellant asserts that Transport, supra, is a "case with facts 
very similar to those of the instant case." Appellant Ts Brief p. 
20. 
The Court in Transport, supra, based its ruling on the 
following facts. Lipsett Steel Products requested F.J. Purdy 
Iron and Metals to examine certain government owned railroad rail 
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and to ascertain the freight charges for delivery of the rail to 
Lipsett in California. F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals and a 
representative of Arrowhead Freight Lines examined the rail as 
requested by Lipsett. Arrowhead quoted a freight rate of thirty-
eight cents per hundred pounds for California delivery. On the 
basis of F.J. Purdy Iron ic Metals' report, Lipsett bid on the 
rail and was awarded a government contract of sale. Lipsett then 
employed F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals to load the rail onto Arrowhead 
trucks. In order to expedite delivery of the rail shipment, F.J. 
Purdy Iron <Jc Metals signed a shipping order providing for the 
thirty-eight cent rate referred to above. The order contained no 
express promise on the part of F.J. Purdy Iron <3c Metals to pay 
the freight charges. The rail was loaded by F.J. Purdy Iron <5c 
Metals and was delivered by Arrowhead to Lipsett in California. 
Lipsett, at the time of delivery, paid the freight charges at the 
thirty-eight cent rate provided for in the shipping order. 
Thereafter, an audit by Arrowhead disclosed that the quoted rate 
was eleven cents less than the lawful rate prescribed by 
Interstate Commerce Commission schedules. Arrowhead's claim was 
assigned to Transport Clearings of Los Angeles. Transport, after 
seeking unsuccessfully to collect the eleven cent differential 
from F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals appealed. Transport Clearings of 
Los Angeles v. F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals, 289 P.2d 172, 172-173, 
supra. The Nevada Supreme Court, based on these facts found that 
the respondent, F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals, "in point of fact was 
not the shipper," and that "Arrowhead through knowledge of 
Lipsett Ts ownership of the rail and of (F.J. Purdy Iron & 
10 
Metals T) true position in the transaction, was aware of this 
fact." Transport Clearings of Los Angeles v. F.J. Purdy Iron & 
Metals, 289 P.2d 172, 173, supra. 
Again, in the instant proceeding, Appellant Boyce Ts position 
is distinguishable from that of F.J. Purdy Iron & Metals in the 
Transpor t case, supra. Whereas F.J. Purdy Iron <3c Metals "in 
point of fact was not the shipper," in the Transpor t case, supra, 
Appellant Boyce was, in fact, the shipper of both freight 
shipments in the instant case. 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, additionally urges that 
Respondent agreed to deliver the August 9, 1982 and the August 
26, 1982 shipments c.o.d. to C.M.C. and/or A.H.W. in Conakry, 
Afr ica: 
3. Carrier breached its undertaking to 
collect both freight and Boyce Ts invoice by 
negligently delivering the parts without so 
do i ng. 
Carrier, consistent with Boyce's oral 
instructions, prepared an air waybill 
directing the parts be held at the Conakry 
Airport and a "cost and freight" worksheet and 
commercial invoice which included the cost of 
the parts and freight charges. Carrier fs 
agent testified these documents meant the 
shipment was to be handled on a cost freight 
basis. 
Appellant T s Br ief at p. 17-18 ; 
and at p. 26, 
The carrier Ts negligent abandonment of the 
goods without collection of charges actually 
constituted conversion of the goods for which 
Boyce could have sought damages equal to the 
invo ice price. 
13 Am.Jur. 2d, Carr iers §454, p. 925 (1964) describes a 
c.o.d. contract as follows: 
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A c.o.d. (collect on delivery) shipment 
is made under a contract whereby the carrier 
undertakes to collect from the consignee, upon 
delivery, a specified amount for and on behalf 
of the consignor, in addition to the carrier ys 
own charges. Thus, a carrier receiving goods 
on a c.o.d. shipment acts in two capacities, 
as bailee to transport the goods and as agent 
to collect the price of the goods. 
Although Appellant does not use the term "c.o.d." or 
"collect on delivery" in framing its argument, the assertions 
from Appellant Ts Brief, supra, directly mirror Am.Jur. Ts 
description of a c.o.d. contract. 
Again, testimony from Appellant Boyce E q u i p m e n t s 
representatives belies Appellant Ts argument that Respondent 
agreed to carry the two shipments on a c.o.d. basis. The 
following discussion took place between Appellant's 
representative, Don Boyce, and Judge Fishier with respect to the 
August 9, 1982 and the August 26, 1982 Shipper's Letter of 
Instructions, Exhibits 7-D and 10-P. 
MR. BOYCE: Well, even on a c.o.d. is the 
thing that would concern you, because c.o.d. 
strictly, when it gets to the other end, if 
they don Tt pick it up then your liable for 
them anyway. 
THE COURT: That's right. These things 
have c.o.d. amounts on there and that's left 
blank, too. 
MR. BOYCE: Uh-huh. (Affirmative. ) l± 
is. That was not sent out c.o.dT (Emphas i s 
added.) 
(TR. 160, Addendum A-3.) 
With respect to the Shipper's Letter of Instructions dated 
August 26, 1982, Exhibit 7-D, Appellant's representative, Mark 
Boyce, on direct examination from Appellant's counsel, admitted 
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that he marked the "collect" box (TR. 93) and further testified 
with respect to the August 9, 1982 shipment, that it was a 
"freight collect shipment," (TR. 86, Addendum A-l and A-2.) 
In Smith v. Southern Exp. Co., 16 So. 62 (Ala. 1894), the 
appellant, Belle Smith, brought action against appellee, Southern 
Express Co., to recover damages for Southern fs failure to collect 
c.o.d. charges upon delivery to the consignee. Smith alleged 
that she sent, by servant, an unmarked package with instructions 
written on a small piece of paper, as follows: "Miss A. McCoy, 
Little Rock, Arkansas, C.O.D. $86.85." The servant delivered the 
package and received in turn a receipt from Southern. This 
receipt nowhere showed that it was a c.o.d. package. Under these 
facts the Alabama Supreme Court made the following ruling: 
. Conceding the written memorandum was 
sent by the plaintiff by her servant, as 
contended, and that it was delivered to the 
agent by the servant, it was a mere offer or 
proposition which was not carried into the 
bill of lading or receipt issued by the agent, 
which omission was, in legal effect, a refusal 
or repudiation of the offer or proposition by 
the defendant. I f the plaintiff, then, 
desired to insist on the carriage of the 
package as a C.O.D. package, it was her duty 
to have refused the receipt, as it was 
written, and insisted upon the contract being 
so written as to carry out that object. Th i s 
she failed to do, but accepted and retained 
the receipt as the evidence of the contract, 
and its terms cannot be altered or varied by 
parol. 
Smith v. Southern Exp. Co., 16 So., 62, 63, supra. 
The instant case is analagous to the Smi th case, supra, in 
that the Shipper Ts Letter of Instructions for both shipments, 
which were given to Appellant at the time of the shipments, 
served as receipts (Appellants Brief p. 6) (TR. 57, Addendum A-
13 
7) and failed to indicate that the shipments were to be delivered 
c.o.d. 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, Respondent herein 
urges this Court to find that Appellant, Boyce Equipment, was not 
in point of fact, acting as an agent for a fully disclosed 
principal and that Appellant did not direct Respondent to deliver 
the shipments c.o.d. 
Point II 
APPELLANT, BOYCE EQUIPMENT, DIRECTED THAT THE FREIGHT SERVICES BE 
PERFORMED ON A rtFREIGHT COLLECT" BASIS WITHOUT EXECUTING ANY KIND 
OF NON-RECOURSE AGREEMENT WITH THE RESPONDENT, AND THEREBY 
ASSUMED THE PRIMARY OBLIGATION TO PAY THE FREIGHT CHARGES FOR 
SAID SERVICES, 
It is a well settled point of law that a shipper or 
consignor who tenders freight to a motor carrier operating in 
interstate commerce for transportation is the party primarily 
liable for freight charges, unless the shipper or consignor and 
the carrier contractually agree that the carrier will look to 
another party only for payment. 
In Louisville & N.R. Co, v. Central Iron & C. Co,, 26 5 U.S. 
59, 66-67, supra, the United State Supreme Court states the 
following with regard to a shipperTs liability for freight 
charges: 
Where the payment is so deferred, the carrier 
may require that it be made before delivery of 
the goods; or concurrently with the delivery; 
or may permit it to be made later. Where the 
payment is deferred, the contract may provide 
that the shipper agrees absolutely to pay the 
charges; or it may provide merely that he 
shall pay if the consignee does not pay the 
charges demanded upon delivery of the goods. 
Or the carrier may accept the goods for 
shipment solely on account of consignee; and 
knowing that the shipper is acting merely as 
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an agent for the consignee, may contract that 
only the latter shall be liable for the 
freight charges. Or both the shipper and 
consignee may be made liable . . . 
To ascertain what 
look pr imar ily to 
in mind that the 
contract was entered into we 
the bills of lading, bearing 
instrument serves both as a 
receipt and as a contract. Ordinarily, the 
person from whom the goods are received for 
shipment assumes the obligation to pay the 
freight charges; and his obligation IT 
ordinarily a primary one. This is true even 
where the bill of lading contains, as here, a 
provision imposing liability upon the 
cons ignee. For the shipper is presumably the 
consignor; the transportation ordered by him 
is presumably on his own behalf; and a promise 
by him to pay therefor is inferred (that is 
implied in fact), as a promise to pay for 
goods is implied when one orders them from a 
dealer. 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, in the instant proceeding denies 
that the Air Waybills for the two shipments, Exhibits 11-P and 
16-P, were shown to, or signed by Appellant before the shipments 
were made by Respondent. Appellant, however, admits that it 
signed the Shipper's Letter of Instructions for both shipments, 
Exhibits 7-D and 10-P (Appellant's Brief p. 2 2 ) , that it marked 
both documents "collect" and/or directed both shipments to be 
made on a "freight collect" basis (TR. 86, 98, Addendum A-1 and 
A-2) and that it was shown and/or received copies of both 
documents (Appellant's Brief p. 13). 
In Consolidated Freightways, etc. v. Pacheo, 488 F.Supp. 68, 
at 70, ( C D . Cal. 1979) it was held that a direction by the 
consignor that a shipment be delivered "freight collect" was 
insufficient to relieve the consignor of liability: 
The procedure by which a shipper or consignor 
may relieve himself of this primary obligation 
to pay the freight charges is to execute the 
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"non-recourse" provisions of the Uniform Bill 
of Lading upon tendering the freight to the 
carr ler . . . 
. .A direction by the consignor that the 
shipment be delivered "freight collect" is 
insufficient to relieve him of liability. 
S e e > New York Central Rail Co. v. Buck Co., 2 
Cal.2d 38T; 4l P72d 547 (1935). Tlmphasis 
added.) 
And, likewise in New York Central Rail Co. v. Buck Co., 2 
Cal.2d 384, 41 P.2d 547, 550 ( C D . Cal. 1979), the case cited by 
Consolidated, supra, it was stated: 
. . . The authorities also hold without 
exception, so far as we are advised, that _a 
mere direction by a consignor or consignee 
liable for the freight that a shipment be 
carried or diverted "freight collect" or 
delivered "upon payment of freight charges" or 
the like, is insufficient to relieve him of 
such 1 iabi1i ty . . . 
. . . In New York Central R. Co. v. Warren 
Ross Lumber Co., 234 N.Y. 261, 137 N.E. 324, 
2 4 A.L.R. 116 0, it was held that the language 
of such a direction was not contractual, its 
effect being merely to give the carrier an 
option to demand payment from the person to 
whom it delivered the goods ~. *. \ (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, additionally asserts that "the 
custom, practice and experience of Boyce and the custom and 
practice of parts suppliers generally in arranging transportation 
for buyers of parts is that the parts are nearly always shipped 
freight collect at the expense of the buyer" (Appellant's Brief 
p. 3-4), and that "Boyce proceeded on the assumption which was 
made known to the Carrier that Boyce Ts normal business practice 
would apply and that carrier would collect the freight upon 
delivery to the buyer." New York Central Rail Co. v. Buck Co., 2 
Cal.2d 384, 41 P.2d 547, 551, supra, however, followed decisions 
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which have held that such a custom, although known to the 
carrier, does not bar the carrier from recovering the freight 
charges from a shipper liable therefor: 
.And, according to the following 
decisions, the freight can be recovered from a 
shipper liable therefor notwithstanding a 
custom, known to the carrier, that the amount 
should be paid by the consignee and deducted 
from the price of the goods, and the consignee 
fails to pay; Atchison, S. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. 
Hunt Bros. Frui t Co., (D.C.) 34 F.2d 582; MosT 
Lumber Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., 219 
Ala. 593, 123 So. 90; Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. 
v. Peterson, 168 Wis. 193, 169 N.W. 558; 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marcel let t i , 256 Mich. 
411, 240 N.W. 4, 78 A.L.R. 923. 
The above cited authorities, then, clearly establish that, 
in the instant case, the District Court erred in its 
interpretation of the legal effect of a bill of lading or 
shipping contract marked "collect" and/or "freight collect." 
Near the end of the District Court proceeding, Judge Fishier told 
Appellant's representative, Don Boyce, "If you Td checked 
rcollect T on both of these [Shipper's Letters of Instructions], I 
think you'd be home free on both of them," (TR. 159, Addendum A-
8 ) . Judge Fishier then stated that "The basis for their (Boyce 
E q u i p m e n t s ) liability is that under 10-P (the Shipper Ts Letter 
of Instructions for the August 9, 1982 shipment) they agreed and 
they checked Tprepaid T and signed off. They agreed to pay off 
the freight in substance" (TR. 163, Addendum A - 9 ) . 
13 Am.Jur.2d Carr iers §477, p. 946 (1964), sets forth the 
correct interpretation of the legal effect of a stipulation in a 
bill of lading directing the carrier to collect freight charges 
from the consignee before making delivery: 
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The general rule is that stipulations in 
a bill of lading that the goods are to be 
delivered to the consignee, "he or they paying 
freight," or any similar provisions, are for 
the benefit of the carrier, so that delivery 
to the consignee without collection of the 
freight will not release the consignor from 
liability therefor, unless there is some 
special stipulation amounting to an express 
agreement, by which the consignor is to be 
exonerated. Similarly, a stipulation in a 
bill of lading that the ultimate consignee, 
shall pay the freight charges, upon 
reconsignment by the consignee, has been held 
not to relieve the latter from liability 
therefor, although there is some authority to 
the contrary. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Conditions of Contract 
stated on the reverse of Respondent, Circle Airfreight's, Uniform 
Air Waybill, contains explicit wording whereby "the shipper 
agrees to guarantee all charges and advances" and thus, assume 
the primary obligation for the payment of the freight charges. 
Specifically, the Uniform Air Waybill issued by Circle Airfreight 
(Addendum A - 1 7 ) , in paragraph five (5) of the Conditions of 
Contract explicitly provides, inter alia: 
The shipper guarantees payment of aJl 
charges and advances. 
In addition, paragraph seven (7) in part, provides as 
follows: 
Carrier is authorized (but shall be under no 
obligation) to advance any duties, taxes or 
charges and to make any disbursements with 
respect to the goods, and shipper, owner, or 
consignee shall be jointly and severally 
liable for the reimbursement thereof. No 
carrier shall be under obligation to incur any 
expense or to make any advance in connection 
with the forwarding or reforwarding of the 
goods except against repayment by the 
shipper. (Emphas is added.) 
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Finally, the Conditions of Contract, in paragraph twelve 
(12) prohibits any alteration or modification of any provision 
contained therein: 
No agent, servant or representative of Carrier 
has authority to alter, modify or waive any 
provision of this contract. 
Thus, it is clear that the Conditions of Contract set forth 
on the reverse side of Respondents Uniform Air Waybill precluded 
any contractual agreement between Appellant and Respondent 
whereby Respondent agreed to look only to A.H.W. and/or C.M.C. 
for payment of the outstanding freight charges. 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent herein, respectfully 
submits that Appellant, Boyce Equipment, directed that both the 
August 9, 1982 and the August 26, 1982 shipments be delivered on 
a "freight collect" basis without signing any kind of non-
recourse agreement with Respondent, and thereby assumed the 
primary obligation to pay the freight charges for both shipments, 
and that the District CourtTs determination that the Shipper's 
Letter of Instruction related to the August 9, 1982 and August 
26, 1982 shipments were materially distinguishable with respect 
to their legal effect, was without merit. 
Point III 
RESPONDENT, CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT, WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION, 
CONTRACTUAL OR OTHERWISE, TO APPELLANT, BOYCE EQUIPMENT, TO 
INSIST UPON PAYMENT FROM CONSIGNEE OF THE FREIGHT CHARGES WHICH 
ARE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING BEFORE MAKING DELIVERY, 
AND IS THEREFORE, NOT ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THE FULL AMOUNT OF 
SAID CHARGES FROM APPELLANT. 
Finally, Appellant urges that Respondent "is equitably 
estopped from claiming Boyce is liable to pay the freight charges 
by [Respondent's] conduct in causing its own loss and for that 
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matter, Boyce Ts loss, by its conduct in transporting the parts 
with the direction that freight be collected at the point of 
dest inat ion." Appellant Ts Brief p. 29. 
Again, Appellant overlooks the well established legal 
principle that a direction by a consignee that a shipment be 
carried "freight collect" or delivered "upon payment of freight 
charges" or the like, is insufficient to relieve the consignor of 
its liability for freight charges, and that the language of such 
a direction is not contractual, its effect being merely to give 
the carrier an option to demand payment from the consignee. See, 
generally Point II, supra. In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
Marcelletti , 78 A.L.R. 923, 925 (Mich. 1932), the Michigan 
Supreme Court based its finding that, delivery by the carrier in 
violation of such a provision will not relieve the shipper from 
the obligation to pay the freight, upon the following: 
"To Whom Carrier May Look for Payment --
Ordinarily a carrier has a right to look for 
his compensation to the person who required 
him to perf#orm the service by causing the 
goods to be delivered to him for 
transportation, and that person is generally 
of course the shipper named in the bill of 
lading or the consignor. The fact that the 
latter does not own the goods has been held 
immaterial, on the ground that the c a r r i e r s 
contract cannot be made to depend on what may 
prove to be the legal effect of the 
negotiations between the consignor and the 
consignee on the title to the property which 
is the subject of transportation. Furthermore 
even though there is a stipulation in a bill 
of lading providing that the consignee shall 
pay the freight, that does not of itself 
relieve the consignor, and a carrier is not 
bound at his peril to enforce the payment of 
freight from the consigneesT The usual clause 
in bills of lading, that a cargo is to be 
delivered to the person named, or his 
assignees, The or they paying freight 1, is 
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only inserted as a recognition or assertion of 
the right of the master of a ship to retain 
the goods carried until his lien is satisfied 
by payment of the freight; it imposes no 
obligation on him to insist on payment befoFe" 
making delivery of the cargo. If he sees fit 
to waive his right of lien and deliver the 
goods without payment of the freight, his 
right to resort to the shipper for 
compensation still remains . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Finally, it should be noted that, under the circumstances of 
this case, any agreement by Respondent to look only to A.H.W. 
and/or C.M.C. for the outstanding freight charges without 
recourse to the Appellant, would violate the provisions of the 
Elkins Act prohibiting discrimination among shippers. See 49 
U.S.C. §10761 (1979). With respect to this point the Marcelletti 
court, supra, commented: 
Discrimination between shippers is 
prohibited by statute. Hence as a matter of 
public policy interstate carriers are required 
not only to make but to collect for like 
services uniform charges from shippers. 4 
R.C.L. 857. In carrying out this policy, it 
has been held: "It is well settled . . . that 
though the goods are only to be delivered upon 
payment by the consignee of the freight 
charges, the shipper is not relieved on 
account of a delivery by the carrier of the 
goods to the consignee without collecting the 
charges, though credit is voluntarily extended 
to the consignee. This right can only be 
barred by limitations or contract." 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Marcelletti, 78 A.L.R. 923, 925, supra. 
And, in Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & C. Co., 
265 U.S. 59, 65, supra, it was held: 
The amount of the freight charges legally 
payable was determined by applying the tariff 
rate to the actual weight. Thus, they were 
fixed by law. No contract of the carrier 
could reduce the amount legally payable, or 
release from liability a shipper who had 
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assumed the obligation to pay the charges. 
Nor could any act of omission of the carrier 
(except the running of the Statute of 
Limitations) estop or preclude it from 
enforcing payment of the full amount by a 
person liable therefor. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent herein admits that it may look to A.H.W. and/or 
C.M.C. for payment of the outstanding freight charges, but 
asserts that this does not affect its right to look only to 
Appellant for said charges. Respondent further asserts that 
Appellant as shipper and as guarantor of the freight charges is 
the proper party to which Respondent should first look for 
payment of said charges. Moreover, Respondents failure to join 
A.H.W. and/or C.M.C. as a party to this action, under the above 
cited authorities, cannot estop or preclude it from enforcing 
payment of the full amount of the freight charges by the 
Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Boyce Equipment, was in point of fact, the 
seller, shipper and consignor of both the August 9, 1982 and 
August 26, 1982 shipments and was not acting on behalf of a fully 
disclosed agent. Furthermore, Appellant did not direct the 
shipments to be delivered c.o.d. 
Appellantfs direction that both shipments be delivered on a 
"collect" or "freight collect" basis was not contractual, its 
effect being merely to give the carrier an option to demand 
payment from the consignee. Such a direction is, therefore, 
insufficient to relieve the consignor of liability for the 
freight charges. Moreover, the Conditions of Contract set forth 
on the reverse side of Respondents Uniform Air Waybill, contains 
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provisions which are not subject to alteration or modification 
that impose absolute liability upon the shipper to guarantee all 
charges and advances, and thus assume the primary obligation for 
the payment of the freight. These provisions clearly precluded 
any contractual agreement between Appellant and Respondent 
whereby Respondent agreed to look to another party only for 
payment of the freight. 
Finally, A p p e l l a n t s argument that Respondent is equitably 
estopped from claiming Appellant is liable for the unpaid freight 
by its conduct in delivering the shipments without collecting the 
freight, overlooks the well established legal principle that a 
direction by a shipper that a shipment be carried "freight 
collect" is insufficient to relieve the shipper of its liability 
for the freight. Indeed, such a direction imposes no obligation 
on the carrier to insist upon payment of the freight before 
delivery. If the carrier delivers without collecting the 
freight, and thereby relinquishes his lien on the goods, the 
carrier Ts right to resort to the shipper for compensation still 
remains. Moreover, it is well settled that this right can only 
be barred by limitations or contract. 
RESPECTFULLY S U B M I T T E D his ay of February, 1986. 
|PlV int i ff-Respondent 
' Avtr f r e igh t 
66 Ex&jyange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
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copies thereof to David S. Cook, Attorney at Law, Attorney for 
Defendant and Appellant, Boyce Equipment, 85 West 400 North, 
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R*ge* 
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Q. OKAY. I DIRECT YOU TO THE -- WELL, LET 
ME ASK YOU: WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE MAN FROM 
CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT IN RESPECT TO THIS FORM AT THE TIME 
WHICH BOX, IF ANY, WAS GOING TO BE CHECKED? 
A. YES. 
Q. JUST ASKING YOU WHETHER THERE WAS ANY 
DISCUSSION. 
A. YES, THERE WAS. AND IT WAS GOING COLLECT. 
IT WAS STIPULATED RIGHT THERE THAT THIS FREIGHT WAS A 
COLLECT FREIGHT SHIPMENT. 
Q. YOU SAY IT WAS STIPULATED? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN IT WAS STIPULATED? DID 
YOU DO SOMETHING --
A. NO. 
0. -- AS FAR AS THIS ORAL CONVERSATION? 
A. JUST TOTALLY ORAL. OUR MAIN CONCERN AND 
THEIR CONCERN WAS FAST. I MEAN, THEY WANTED IT FAST; 
AND THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT JUST DIDN'T COME UP. 
BUT I DID TELL THEM, I SAYS THAT THIS IS 
A COLLECT SHIPMENT; AND HE COMPLETELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT. 
Q. WELL, WHEN YOU SAY "HE COMPLETELY ACKNOWLEDGED 
">AT," LET'S HAVE THE CONVERSAT I ON. 

























E X H I B I T D - 7 , SHIPPER'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS, DATED 8 - 2 6 
DO YOU SEE THAT DOCUMENT? 
A. UH-HUH. ( A F F I R M A T I V E . ) 
Q. THAT'S A WHITE COPY? 
A. YES. 
Q. BEARS SOME HANDWRITTEN MATERIAL? 
A. YES. THAT'S ALL -- ALL MINE EXCEPT FOR 
THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND SIDE. 
Q. IT'S ALL YOURS EXCEPT FOR MR. SHEPARD'S 
SIGNATURE AND A DATE APPEARING IMMEDIATELY TO THE RIGHT 
OF YOUR SIGNATURE? 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q. THAT DOCUMENT HAS A CHECK MARKED IN THE 
80X "COLLECT." DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF WHEN THAT 
CHECK MARK WAS INSERTED? 
A. AT THE TIME, AT THE TIME OF THE PICKUP. 
Q. WAS THAT A MULTI-COPY DOCUMENT, OR DON'T 
YOU RECALL? 
A. I DON'T RECALL. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE NEXT COMMUNICATION, IF ANY, 
YOU PARTICIPATED IN WITH CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT ABOUT THESE 
MATTERS OR THIS MATTER? 
A. THEY HAD CALLED ME MAYBE TWO, THREE WEEKS 
AFTER THE LAST SHIPMENT AND HAD ASKED ME IF WE HAD --
IF WE HAD MORE FREIGHT THAT WAS -- THAT WAS GOING BACK 
1 TO AFRICA." HE WOULDN'T BE ON NOTICE BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T 
2 KNOW IF YOU'VE ALREADY BEEN PREPAID FOR THE FREIGHT AND 
3 PREPAID FOR THE GOODS. AND HE MAY THINK, "WELL, JEEZ, 
4 WHEN YOUR OX IS MIRED, YOU'VE GOT TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSAR 
5 TO GET THINGS GOING,"AND MAYBE IT'S WORTH SOMEBODY TO 
6 PAY FIVE THOUSAND FOR SOME TRUCK PARTS AND THEN PAY FIVE 
7 THOUSAND FOR FREIGHT. 
8 THIS WOULD NOT PUT THEM ON NOTICE. THEY 
9 WOULD HAVE NO IDEA WHAT YOU'RE DOING. I DON'T THINK 
10 THEY HAVE A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO THAT. 
H MR. BOYCE: WELL, EVEN ON A C.O.D. IS THE 
12 THING THAT WOULD CONCERN YOU, BECAUSE C.O.D. STRICTLY, 
13 WHEN IT GETS TO THE OTHER END, IF THEY DON'T PICK IT 
14 I UP THEN YOU'RE LIABLE FOR THEM ANYWAY. 
15 THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. THESE THINGS 
16 HAVE C.O.D. AMOUNTS ON THERE AND THAT'S LEFT BLANK, TOO. 
17 MR. BOYCE: UH-HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE.) IT 
18 I IS. THAT WAS NOT SENT OUT C.O.D. 
19 THE COURT: I'M SORRY, MR. BOYCE. 
20 MR. SEGAL: YOUR HONOR, IS THE JUDGMENT 
21 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE INVOICE, OR 
22 30 DAYS THEREAFTER? 
23 THE COURT: THE INVOICE -- WHEN WAS YOUR 
24 FIRST INVOICE? LET ME SEE HERE. I ONLY -- THE AIRWAY 
25 BILL --
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COOK: 
Q. MR. BOYCE, HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN INVOLVED 
IN THE PARTS BUSINESS IN CONNECTION WITH BOYCE EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY? 
A. I'VE BEEN WITH MY FATHER FOR APPROXIMATELY 
TEN YEARS. 
Q. WHAT IS THE GENERAL NATURE OF 80YCE 
EQUIPMENT'S BUSINESS? 
A. WE SUPPLY MILITARY TRUCK PARTS. 
Q. BASICALLY WHERE DO YOUR CUSTOMERS COME FROM? 
A. ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES, GENERALLY. 
Q. ANY OUT OF THE U.S.? 
A. YEAH. WE DO A LOT OF CANADIAN SHIPMENTS, 
A LOT OF ALASKAN SHIPMENTS. 
Q. DID YOU DEAL ON BEHALF OF BOYCE EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY WITH A.H.W., INC. AND C.M.C. IN THE FALL OF 1982? 
•A. YES. 
Q. IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, DID YOU COME TO 
AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ONE NAMED 
A.H.W., INC. AND THE OTHER NAME C.M.C. CORP.? 
A. SAME PARENT COMPANY. I THOUGHT IT WAS A 
NAME CHANGE IS ALL. 
Q. I HAND YOU -- LET'S SEE -- WHAT HAS BEEN 
PREVIOUSLY MARKED AS EXHIBIT .1-0 AND ASK IF YOU RECOGNIZE 
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ADDENDUM A-4 
Q. AND WHERE IS THAT? 
A. THAT'S IN NORTH SALT LAKE, 51 SOUTH HIGHWAY 
89. 
Q. OKAY, PROCEED. THEN YOU DIALED CIRCLE 
AIRFREIGHT? 
A. I DIALED CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT AND I CALLED --
I BELIEVE IT WAS A GENTLEMAN. I'M NOT SURE. 
Q. WELL, DID SOMEBODY ANSWER THE PHONE? 
A. THEY ANSWERED THE PHONE, SAYS -- SAID, "CIRCLE 
AIRFREIGHT." 
Q. JUST SLOW DOWN. 
A. I'M SORRY. 
Q. I WANT THE CONVERSATIONS, THE SUBSTANCE 
OF IT, AS BEST YOU CAN RECALL. 
A. OKAY. I CALLED CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT AND ASKED 
THEM IF THEY COULD ARRANGE SHIPPING FOR A LARGE BOX AND 
A LOT OF WEIGHT TO GO TO CONAKRY, AFRICA. 
AND HE SAYS, "YES, WE CAN." 
AND I SAYS, "WELL, IT'S GOING TO TAKE ME 
A COUPLE OF DAYS TO GET IT READY." 
AND THEY SAYS, "JUST GIVE ME A CALL WHEN 
IT'S READY." 
AND AT THAT TIME I GOT OFF THE PHONE AND 
COMMENCED PACKAGING THE SHIPMENT UP. 
Q. WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE IN THAT PHONE 
78 
1 A. CONVERSATION, I MEAN. 
2 Q. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED --
3 A. "LET ME GET THE FORKLIFT. I'LL COME AROUND 
4 AND LOAD IT UP FOR YOU." 
5 THE ONLY -- I MENTIONED TO HIM, YOU KNOW, 
6 THAT IT WAS GOING A LONG WAYS, AGAIN; AND HE WAS KIND 
7 J OF SURPRISED, YOU KNOW, FOR HOW FAR IT WAS GOING AND FOR 
8 THE WEIGHT THAT WE HAD -- THE WEIGHT THAT WE HAD THERE. 
9 AND AS WE WAS LOADING IT, MY DAD MADE THE 
1 0 MENTION TO HIM THAT -- HE SAYS, UM, HE SAYS, "BOY THIS 
,, IS GOING TO BE A LOT OF FREIGHT. IT'S A GOOD THING WE 
1 2 DON'T HAVE TO PAY THE FREIGHT BILL." 
13 AND HE SAYS, "SO DO I?" 
14 THAT'S FROM THE CIRCLE AIRFREIGHT DRIVER. 
15 Q. OKAY. WAS THERE ANYTHING MORE TO THAT 
16 CONVERSATION? 
17 A. NO. 
18 Q. THAT YOU RECALL? 
19 A. NO. 
20 Q. WERE THERE ANY DOCUMENTS PREPARED OR SIGNED 
21 BY YOU AT THAT TIME? 
22 A. YEAH. WE DID THE OTHER SHIPPER LETTER OF -
23 Q. INSTRUCTIONS? 
24 A. SHIPPER -- OF INSTRUCTIONS. 
25 Q. I HAND YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS DEFENDANT' 
DOCUMENT? 
A. IT LOOKS LIKE THE 26TH OF AUGUST 1982. 
Q. AND AFTER THAT DOCUMENT WAS COMPLETED, DO 
YOU HAVE SOME USE FOR THAT DOCUMENT? 
A. THIS DOCUMENT BASICALLY IS JUST A NOTE THAT 
WE RECEIVED THE FREIGHT FROM THE CUSTOMER. 
Q. DID YOU PERSONALLY RECEIVE THE FREIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AT THE TIME YOU RECEIVED THE FREIGHT WERE 
THERE ANY CONVERSATIONS? 
A. I DON'T REMEMBER. THERE PROBABLY WAS. 
Q. TO THE BEST OF YOUR RECOLLECTION, DID YOU 
PARTICIPATE ANY FURTHER IN THE TRANSACTION DATED AUGUST 
26TH? 
A. NO. 
Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INITIAL 
SHIPMENT OF AUGUST 6TH WAS ACTUALLY SHIPPED? 
A. OF AUGUST THE 9TH OR THE 6TH? 
Q. AUGUST 9TH, EXCUSE ME. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND HOW ARE YOU AWARE? 
A. THROUGH TELEXES FROM OUR OVERSEAS OFFICES 
AND THEN THROUGH CONSTANT UPDATES. WHEN WE SENT A SHIPMENT 
OUT, I WOULD CONTINUALLY MONITOR THE SHIPMENT UNTIL IT 
WAS RECEIVED ON THE OTHER END. 
57 
1 ANY WORSE FOR YOU IN.THIS SCENARIO. BUT WHEN YOU SIGNED 
2 THAT AND THE'BOX IS CHECKED, I THINK THAT WHEN YOU SIGN 
I THESE THINGS YOU'VE GOT TO VERIFY OR CHECK TO MAKE SURE 
4 ALL THE BOXES ARE CHECKED. 
5 IT'S JUST LIKE WHEN I'M THE JUDGE, MR. COOK 
6 AND MR. SEGAL SOMETIMES COME TO ME AND THEY SAY, "JUDGE, 
7 I WANT YOU TO SIGN THIS," AND I TELL THEM I DON'T SIGN 
8 ANYTHING WITH BLANKS. AND IF THERE IS A CHECK, THEN 
9 j SOMETIMES I'LL INITIAL IT. I THINK THAT WOULD BE A LITTL 
10 BIT MUCH. 
If BUT IF, BEFORE YOU'D SIGNED OFF, IF YOU'D 
12 CHECKED "COLLECT," I THINK IF YOU HAD DOCUMENTS INDICATIN 
13 THAT YOU HAD "COLLECT" ON BOTH OF THESE, I THINK YOU'D 
14 BE HOME FREE ON BOTH OF THEM. 
15 MR. BOYCE: I'LL WORK HARDER TO FIND IT 
16 SOMEHOW, BUT IT JUST BLOWS MY MIND. 
17 THE COURT: AND OF COURSE YOUR POINT THAT, 
18 "JEEZ," YOU WOULD NOT SIGN, I MEAN, "PUTTING THOSE THINGS 
19 ' I SAW SOMEWHERE AND I DON'T KNOW WHERE, BUT I SAW SOMEWHER 
20 THAT WENT BY AIR FRANCE TO GUINEA," AND TO PUT AXLES AND 
21 A 350 CUMMINS BELL HOUSING ON AN AIR FRANCE JET, I 
22 AGREE WITH YOU, IT BORDERS ON INSANITY. 
23 BUT THERE WOULD BE NO WAY THE SHIPPER OR 
24 THE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY WOULD KNOW. JUST LOOKING 
25 AT THIS THEY SAY, "JEEZ, THIS GUY'S FLYING TRUCK PARTS 
15< 
NOT, WE'LL BE BACK IF THAT'S AGREEABLE TO THE COURT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. BASICALLY WHAT I'M S.AYINi 
IS: BASED UPON THOSE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE BOYCES 
HAD WITH CIRCLE, THEY KNEW THAT THEY WERE SHIPPING AS 
AGENTS BUT WOULD NOT BE LIABLE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE 
OF.EVENTS; AND I THINK THAT IT'S SET FORTH -- I THINK 
JUSTICE BRANDEIS SET IT FORTH IN THAT LOUISVILLE CASE. 
THE BASIS FOR THEIR LIABILITY IS THAT UNDER 10-P THEY 
AGREED AND THEY CHECKED "PREPAID" AND SIGNED OFF. THEY 
AGREED TO PAY OFF THE FREIGHT IN SUBSTANCE. 
MR. BOYCE: YOUR HONOR, WE DIDN'T SIGN 
IT'S PREPAID AND I HOLD TO THAT FACT. I JUST CAN'T --
I JUST CAN TELL -- HE EVEN ADMITTED -- WELL, I'VE GOT 
A LOT OF MONEY HERE. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. 
MR. BOYCE: AND IT BOTHERS ME TO A DEGREE; 
AND NOT THAT I MISJUDGE YOU AS A JUDGE OR ANYTHING, AND 
I KNOW YOU HAVE A HELL OF A HARD RESPONSIBILITY — 
THE COURT: WELL, IF YOU HAD ANOTHER 7-D --
MR. BOYCE: I'LL FIND ONE, SO HELP ME GOD. 
MR. M. BOYCE: I'LL FIND THAT BUGGAR. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO TALK 
TO YOUR ATTORNEY ABOUT MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
PREPARE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION! 
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^ f ^ / Z T / ^ V ^ D o t e ^ ? 
CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT 
(1) As used In this contract, "air waybill'* is equivalent to "air consign 
ment note", "shipper" Is equivalent to "consignor", "carriage" is 
equivalent to "transportation" and "Carrier" includes the earner or for 
warder issuing this air waybill and all carriers that carry the goods 
hereunder or perform any other services related to such carnage For the 
purpose* of the exemption from and limitation of liability provisions set 
forth or referred to herein, "Carrier" Includes agents, servants, or 
representatives of ahy such corner Carriage to be performed hereunder 
by several successive carriers is regarded as a single operation 
(2) (a) Carnage hereunder is subject to the rules relating to liability 
established by the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating 
to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw, October 12, 1929 
(hereinafter called "the Convention"), unless such carnage is not "mtrr 
national carnage" as defined by the Convention (See Corner's tariffs for 
such definition ) 
(b) Td the extent not in conflict with the foregoing, carnage hereunder 
and other services performed by each Carrier are subject to (i) applicable 
laws (Including national laws implementing the Convention), govern 
men^ regulations orders and requirements,(n) provisions herein set forth, 
and (H I ) applicab'e tariffs, rules and regulations of such Corner, which 
ate made parf hereof and which may be inspected at any of its offices 
(c)'For the purposes ^of-the Convention, the agreed stopping places 
(which may be altered by Corner in case of necessity) are those places, 
except the place of departure and the place of destination, set forth on 
the face hereof. 
(d) In the* case of carriage subject to the Convention, the shipper 
acknowledges that he has been given an opportunity to make a special 
declaration of the volue of the gdods dt delivery and that the sum entered 
on the face of thb air waybill as "Shipper's/Consignor's Declared Value-
For Carriage," Ifwn excess of U S. $20 00 per kilo constitutes such special 
declaration of ^ fcilue. 
* 
(3) Insofor as any provision contained or referred to »n this a f waybill 
may be contrary^ja^iandatory-Jaw, government regulations orders,or re-
quirementc sycJVprovision shall remain applicable to the extent that it is 
noi overildc^^fneremUThe invalidity of any provision shall not affect 
my ottW oart hereof 
4) Except as the Contention or other applicable law may otherwise re 
:juire# (a) Carrier is not (table to the shipper or to any other person for any 
damage,' delay or lesi of whatsoever nature (hereinafter collectively 
eferred to as "damage ') arising out of or in connection with the carriage 
>f the goods, unless such damage is proved to Have been caused by the 
negligence or wilful faplt of Carrier and there has been no contributory 
negligence of the shipper consignee or other claimant (b) Carrier »s not 
•able for any damage directly or indirectly arising out of compliance wi*h 
aws, government regulations orders or requirements or from any cause 
>eyond Carrier s control, (c) the charges for carnage having been based 
ipon fhe va! j e declared by shipper it is agreed that any liability shall m 
o event exceed the shipper's declared value 'or carnage stated on the 
'ice hereof and in thn absence of such dec'arotion by shipper liability of 
arner sha" no* ",rrr»»d U S $?0 00 per k»lo o' goods destroyed lost 
amaged or de ayed all claims sna" be sublet to proof of value (a a 
arner issuing an ac waybill for carnage exclusively over 'he lr es of 
thers does so only as a sales agent 
5) It is ogreed that no time is fixed for the completer f carnage 
ereunder and that Corner may without notice substitute a'tema'e car 
ers or aircraft Corner assume^ no obi gat on »o cot , '^  - i '"> 4 L / an\ 
?ecified aircraft or o/er any DCJ'*ICL lar route or route^ or r i* _ n n ^ 
on at any po»nf orcordmg 'o iny pcrttcular schficu c ( ome r 
ereby outhorijn ' o select or J» /i<;te 'rem ,l"'» re < r i ' * -H 
lent r>otwt!k *nntj g that the $ r~r> m p y \r o j aU _, or i ( T f er t T 
mmal or airport offfce at the place of departure 'o the airport a» the place 
Of destination If so specifically agrend the gar ds or packaqes said to 
contain the goods, described on the face hep >f an* also accepted for 
forwarding to the airport of departure and for 'e'orwardmq beyond the 
airport of destination If such forwerrdinq or reforwordmg is by carnage 
"Operated by Carrier, such carnage shall be upon the same terms as to 
liability as set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 4 hereof In any other event, the 
[issuing corner and last carner,respecf»vely,in forwarding or reforwarding 
the goods, shall do so only as agents of the shipper, owner or consignee, 
as the case may be, and shall not be liable for any damage arising out of 
such additional carnage, unless proved to hove been caused by its own 
negligence or wilful fault The shipper, owner, and consignee hereby 
authorize such corners to do all things deemed advisable to effect such 
forwarding or reforwordmg, Including, but not without limitation, selec-
tion of the means of forwarding'or reforwordmg and the routes thereof 
(unless these have been herein specified by the shipper), execution and 
acceptance of documents of carnage (which may include provisions ex-
empting or limiting liability) and consigning of goods with no declaration 
of value, not withstanding any declaration of value in this air waybill 
(7) Carrier is authorized (but shall be under no obligation) to advance 
any duties taxes or charges and to make any disbursements with respect 
to the goods, and the shipper, owner and consignee shall be jointly and 
severally I able for the reimbursement therof No Carrier shall be under 
obligation to incur any expense or to make any advance in connection 
With the forwarding or reforwordmg of the goods except against repay-
ment by the shipper If it is necessary to make customs entry of fhe goods 
at any place, the goods shall be deemed to be consigned at such place to 
the person named on the face hereof as customs consignee or, if no such 
person be named, to the corner carrying the goods to such place or to 
Such customs consignee, if any, as such carrier may designate 
(8) At the request of the shipper, and if the appropriate premium is paid 
and the fact recorded on the fate hereof, the goods covered by this air 
waybill are insured on behalf of the shipper under an open policy for the 
amount requested by the shipper as set out on the face hereof subject to 
the terms and conditions of such open policy which is available for in-
spection by the shipper Claims under such policy must be reported im-
mediately to an office of Carrier 
(9) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract delivery of 
the goods will be made only to the consignee 'named on the face hereof, 
unless such consignee is one of the Carriers participating m the carnage, 
in which event delivery shall b« made to the person indicated on the face 
hereof as the person to be notified Notice of arrival of the goods will, in 
fhe absence of other instructions, be sent to the Consignee, or the person 
to be notified by ordinary methods, Carrier is not liable for non-receipt 
or delay m receipt or such notice 
(10) (a) No action shall be maintained in the case of damage to goods 
unless a written notice sufficiently describing the goods concerned, the 
approximate date of the damage and the de?a '$ of the claim is 
presented to issuing Carrier within 7 days from fhe date of receipt thereof, 
and m the case of loss ( needing non de'ivery) u^'ess presented within 
120 do\s f n n the date of issue oi the air Aavb^ 
(b) Any rights *o damages oau nst Corner sho1 t e '•**' nguis^a unless an 
action s pro ghf v 'hin *wo >fars a^*^r , U P OC \.rrr»r\rc of the events giv-
ing nse to the cla m 
(11) The shipper shall comply with a!'aopiicobie iws customs and other 
government regulations of any counts to ir^m hroucjh or over which 
the goods may be amec clu d na "^ n <p , ^ n k i 1 ppc^tng car 
n a a n Or d " ' i v c r y O* ^ n anods a n d Suo 'or' • <. ' l r»->rm ' on and at 
tach sjch do'u r r^ r" • i f^is a r /,-Kfc I v "• , > M^ <"^C ? comply 
wi th sucr- ' ' i G 1 r ^u la t i on * Co ' r er s < ' l » ' i »'fCr any 
other p«-»r \ i f - r «p< se d t r1 r ^ ' . ' T1P'y w i ' h 
•r ' n v 
